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Abstract
How robust are economic models to the introduction of irrational agents? The
Pareto e¢ ciency of competitive equilibria is not robust: one irrational agent leads
to ine¢ ciency. But the property that rational agents cannot use their own resources
to Pareto-improve on their competitive allocation holds regardless of the number of
irrational agents. Full production e¢ ciency can be robust as well, but irrational
rms introduce a trade-o¤ between e¢ ciency and the attainment of Pareto improve-
ments. Regarding games, we show that while existing implementation mechanisms
are sensitive to the presence of irrational agents there are robust alternatives with
attractive welfare properties.
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1 Introduction
We consider properties of economic equilibria that are irrationality-proof,that is, robust
to the inclusion of irrational agents. Irrational agents are simply consumers who make
errors when maximizing utility subject to a budget constraint and rms that do not
maximize prots. A propertys degree of irrationality-proofness is gauged by the number
of irrational agents who can be added to a model without overturning the property.
If just one consumer or rm in a general equilibrium model chooses irrationally, a
competitive equilibrium need not be Pareto e¢ cient. The Pareto e¢ ciency of competitive
equilibria thus exhibits the lowest level of irrationality-proofness and its account of the
welfare advantages of a market economy must therefore be misleading. As a replacement
for Pareto e¢ ciency, we show that, regardless of the number of irrational agents, the
rational consumers and rms cannot Pareto improve on their equilibrium allocation if
they are restricted to use only their own endowments and technologies, a property we call
Pareto e¢ ciency for the rational agents. Since this property prevails no matter how
many agents are irrational, it exhibits the highest level of irrationality-proofness. The
proof that competitive equilibria enjoy this property is only a tiny variant of the classical
argument that competitive allocations are in the core, but the applicability of the classical
argument to models with irrational agents does not seem to have been noticed.
More important results hold for production economies. If the rational rms in the
aggregate have a production set that contains the production set of the irrational rms,
and if production sets satisfy a limited constant-returns property then full production
e¢ ciency obtains. The production e¢ ciency of competitive equilibria thus displays an
intermediate degree of irrationality proofness: it can persist in the presence of some irra-
tional rms but not if there are so many irrational rms that the rational rmstechnology
fails to dominate that of the irrational rms. The contrast between full e¢ ciency on the
production side and Pareto e¢ ciency for the rationalon the consumer side supports the
folk wisdom that competitive markets root out ine¢ ciency in production while leaving
irrational households untouched. Error-prone consumers have the room to persist in their
mistakes, but markets do not grant rms the same leeway.1 Becker (1957) argued long
1Evolutionary selection, as in Sandroni (2000) and Blume and Easley (2006), would qualify this
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ago that an attempt by irrational rms to racially discriminate in hiring can be made
irrelevant by competition from fully rational rms.
Full production e¢ ciency can obtain in the presence of irrational rms due to creative
destruction: the rational rms drive the irrational out of business. This causal mechanism
for production e¢ ciency leads to distinctive policy conclusions. Economists have custom-
arily turned to lump-sum payments to compensate agents that would be harmed by and
therefore might block policy reforms; lump-sum payments to rational agents do not lead
to ine¢ ciency. But an irrational rm that receives a compensation payment can make
ine¢ cient decisions and remain shielded from bankruptcy. Irrational rms can therefore
jeopardize the long tradition, based on the second welfare theorem, of using compensa-
tion payments to design Pareto improvements. Consider the conversion of crop subsidies
into lump-sum payouts in the Common Agricultural Policy of the EU or the granting of
carbon permits to rms to mitigate the burden of a carbon tax. Normally economists
back these policies, but the presence of irrational rms can overturn this advice.
To see if markets are unusually robust to the addition of irrational agents, we compare
markets to games that fully implement competitive allocations. If everyone is rational,
implementation games can closely approximate the outcomes of competitive markets; in
some cases, their equilibrium outcomes can exactly coincide with the competitive equilib-
rium outcomes. But if some agents are irrational then the most well-known full imple-
mentation games can have no equilibria or have equilibria that are not Pareto e¢ cient for
the rational agents. For example, the famous Hurwicz-Maskin-Postlewaite (1995) imple-
mentation game typically has no equilibria when just a single agent is irrational: existence
of equilibrium in this game therefore fails to show even the lowest degree of irrationality-
proofness. This fragility may be one reason why the equilibria of Nash implementation
games can seem implausible. But there are alternative games where irrational agents
do less damage: we construct games whose outcomes are Pareto e¢ cient for the rational
agents at every equilibrium, regardless of how many irrational agents are present. The
Pareto e¢ ciency for the rationalconclusion for games echoes our results for competi-
tive markets, even though the formal arguments at work in the two settings have little
conclusion. As we explain in section 3, our arguments have no evolutionary component.
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in common. The parallelism suggests that Pareto e¢ ciency for the rational will hold
widely in models with irrational agents. On the other hand, in the game setting Pareto
e¢ ciency for the rational does not imply that the rational agents will usually gain from
the presence of irrational agents, as they do in competitive equilibria.
We assume that rational agents in games best-respond to the actions taken by the
irrational agents. This approach stakes out a middle ground that avoids both the ex-
treme rationality assumption that all agents play best responses and the position that the
consequences of irrationality are so unforeseeable that rational agents must adopt actions
that are always optimal regardless of how irrational agents play. The latter approach
would amount to a dominant strategy requirement that we show leads an to impossibility
result.
In both the market and game settings, the agents in this paper make errors: consumers
who fail to solve constrained maximization problems, rms that do not maximize prots,
and players who fail to best-respond. Prominent among the sources of error are the
rules of thumb that arise when agents, out of inertia, stick to old decision rules that have
lost their validity. But irrationality does not entail unpredictability. If anything, agents
who follow rules of thumb are easy to predict. Equilibrium analysis is therefore suitable:
rational agents should be able to adjust their actions to the behavior of the irrational
agents in such a way that a prole of mutually consistent actions can emerge.
In our results, Pareto e¢ ciency for the rational agents illustrates the highest level
of irrationality-proofness; it holds no matter how many irrational agents are present.
Other properties of market equilibria exhibit the next best level: they hold when just a
single agent is rational. No-arbitrage conditions in nance typically display this degree of
irrationality-proofness. If an arbitrage opportunity is present for example, if asset prices
fail to satisfy a martingale then every agent must be failing to exploit an opportunity
to make a risk-free prot and hence must be irrational.2
For some phenomena, it has long been the norm to consider the e¤ect of irrational
agents, for example, the impact of noise traders on nancial markets (see, e.g., De Long
2The martingale property of asset prices and its link to rationality requirements originates in Samuelson
(1965); the modern approach begins with Harrison and Kreps (1979). The strong irrationality-proofness
of the property is well-known, but it is di¢ cult to document an explicit statement.
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et al. (1990)). The impact of partisan voters agents who always vote for the same
candidate regardless of their information on information aggregation (Feddersen and
Pesendorfer (1996)) can also be understood as an analysis of irrationality-proofness. But
general theories of the e¤ect of irrational agents have been rare. Haltiwanger and Wald-
man (1985, 1989) consider various games with the express purpose of seeing how irrational
agents a¤ect equilibrium outcomes; their results turn on whether strategic substitutes or
complements are present. Fehr and Tyran (2005) and Camerer and Fehr (2006) have
deepened this line of analysis. Sutton (1997) analyzes a class of industrial organization
games with a one rational agent is enoughdegree of irrationality-proofness, comparable
to the no-arbitrage conditions of nance.
In contrast to the above literatures, when we consider the irrationality-proofness of
games we take the implementation point of view: we do not consider the e¤ect of irrational
agents on a specic game but on what games with irrational agents can in principle achieve.
Our analysis is therefore related to Eliaz (2002), which we discuss in section 4. We do
however share one feature with the above literatures: our agents are either rational or
irrational. Another way to introduce a small amount of irrationality is to let agents 
possibly all agents be a little irrational; the quantal response equilibria of McKelvey
and Palfrey (1995) is a leading case in point.
2 Irrational consumers
The analysis of exchange economies with irrational agents is straightforward, involving
only a simple variation on Lloyd Shapleys proof that competitive allocations lie in the
core. But this argument is the natural place to start and it shows how well-suited the
theory of the core is to models with irrational agents.
We consider a nite set of agents I partitioned into the rational agents IR and irra-
tional agents IIR. There are L goods. Each i 2 I has a nonzero endowment of these
goods ei > 0 and a complete, transitive, and locally nonsatiated preference relation %i
whose corresponding strict preference relation is i.3
3Local nonsatiation means that for each xi 2 RL+ and " > 0 there is a yi 2 RL+ such that yi i xi
and
xi   yi < ". For vector inequalities we use the notation: x  y , xk  yk for all coordinates k,
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The rational agents behave like standard consumers. Given a price vector p  0, a
rational agent i chooses a bundle from the budget set Bi = fxi 2 RL+ : p  xi = p  eig
that is weakly preferred to all other bundles in Bi. The irrational agents also have
preference relations but can err when making constrained optimization decisions. We
therefore assume only that an irrational agent i chooses some bundle from Bi.
An exchange equilibrium is a (p  0; x = (xi)i2I) such that
 Pi2I xi Pi2I ei,
 xi 2 Bi for all i 2 I,
 if i 2 IR and exi 2 Bi then xi %i exi.
The irrationality of agents need not threaten the existence of exchange equilibria, which
requires the continuity of agentsdemand functions but not the rationality of preferences.
We say that a coalition of agents C can achieve (exi)i2C by exiting ifPi2C exi Pi2C ei,
and that an exchange equilibrium (p; x) is Pareto e¢ cient for the rational agents if there
does not exist a (exi)i2IR that IR can achieve by exiting such that exi %i xi for all i 2 IR,
and exi i xi for some i 2 IR.
In the language of cooperative game theory, a coalition of agents blocksan allocation
x if the coalition can achieve an allocation by exiting that makes every i in the coalition at
least as well o¤ as at xi and at least one i in the coalition better o¤. Thus an equilibrium
(p; x) is Pareto e¢ cient for the rational agents if the rational agents cannot block x.
Feasible allocations that cannot be blocked by any coalition are in the core. Since the
irrational agents choose arbitrary rather than optimal bundles from their budget sets, the
allocation x of an exchange equilibrium with irrational agents will usually not be Pareto
optimal; hence x could be blocked by I and is not in the economys core. But the
same argument that shows that an arbitrary coalition of agents cannot block a standard
competitive equilibrium applies to the coalition of rational agents. Thus the irrational
agents, though they stand in the way of full Pareto optimality, will not lead the rational
agents to split o¤ on their own.
x > y , (x  y and x 6= y), and x y , xk > yk for all coordinates k.
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Proposition 1 Exchange equilibria are Pareto e¢ cient for the rational agents regardless
of the number of irrational agents.
Proofs are in the appendix. Proposition 1 does not say that the coalition of rational
agents cannot achieve a Pareto improvement by manipulating its market demands to
change p and the commodity demands of the irrational agents. There could well be a bp
and a feasible allocation bx such that (i) the irrational agents demand (bxi)i2IIR at the price
vector bp and (ii) the rational agents are all strictly better o¤ with bx than at the exchange
equilibrium. See McFadden (1969).
Proposition 1 does not address whether the rational agents gain anything from their
trades with the irrational agents. Could the rational agents do equally well by themselves?
If the irrational agents have trade with nonzero value with the rational agents and the
rational agents have strictly convex preferences, there is an unambiguous answer.4
Proposition 2 If in an exchange equilibrium (p; x) the rational agents have trade with
nonzero value with the irrational agents (p(k)
P
i2IR(x
i(k)  ei(k)) 6= 0 for some good k)
and if the rational agents have strictly convex preferences, then any allocation that the
rational agents can achieve by exiting leaves at least one rational agent i worse o¤ than
at is equilibrium allocation.
The signicance of Proposition 2 lies in the contrast to games that lead to allocations
that are Pareto e¢ cient for the rational. When rational and irrational agents interact
through competitive markets, irrational agents still have something to o¤er: they allow
the rational agents to achieve welfare levels that they could not achieve on their own. We
will see in section 4 that games with irrational agents need not share this property.
The nonzero trade condition in Proposition 2 is generic: if we use a standard para-
meterization of agentsexcess demand functions then, for almost every model, in each
competitive equilibrium any set of agents will have trade with nonzero value with the
remaining agents. Proposition 2 can therefore be read as a remark that competitive
equilibria cannot be fragmented; whether or not some agents are irrational, a competitive
allocation typically cannot be achieved by partitioning the set of agents into blocs who
do not trade with each other.
4Agent i has strictly convex preferences if xi %i yi, xi 6= yi, and  2 (0; 1) imply xi+(1 )yi i yi.
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3 Irrational rms
Even when Pareto e¢ ciency for the rational agents obtains, irrational consumers still cause
harm in that they obstruct full Pareto optimality. Irrational producers for example, rms
that stick with a backward technology or that indulge a desire to discriminate in hiring 
need not lead to any harm at all.
Let Yj be the production set of rm j. We assume that each rm j is capable of
inaction, 0 2 Yj. Given p, a rational rm j chooses a prot-maximizing yj in Yj whereas
an irrational rm may take any action as long as it does not go bankrupt. So the only
restriction on an irrational rm j is that it choose a yj 2 Yj such that p  yj  0.
We label the economys nite set of rms F , partitioned into the rational rms FR
and irrational rms FIR. Dene the aggregate production set of the rational rms, YR =P
j2FR Yj, the aggregate production set of the irrational rms, YIR =
P
j2FIR Yj, and the
aggregate production set overall, Y = YR + YIR =
P
j2F Yj.
Let ij  0 be the ownership share of consumer i in rm j where, for each rm j,P
i2I ij = 1. Given p and the production decisions (yj)j2F , consumer is prot income
is
P
j2F ijp  yj, and so the budget set for agent i is now Bi = fxi 2 RL+ : p  xi =
p  ei +Pj2F ijp  yjg. A production equilibrium is a (p  0, x = (xi)i2I , y = (yj)j2F)
such that
 Pi2I xi Pi2I ei +Pj2F yj,
 xi 2 Bi for all i 2 I,
 if i 2 IR and exi 2 Bi then xi %i exi,
 yj 2 Yj for all j 2 F ,
 if j 2 FR and eyj 2 Yj then p  yj  p  eyj,
 if j 2 FIR then p  yj  0.
Proposition 1 that equilibria are Pareto e¢ cient for the rational agents no matter
the number of irrational agents  extends to production equilibria. The only wrinkle
concerns the production possibilities that are available to the rational agents if they exit.
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When a rational rm j that exits is wholly owned by rational consumers, the departing
rational agents should have access to all of Yj. But if a rational rm j is partly owned by
irrational consumers, the irrational consumers who remain behind should not be denied
all use of js technology. We could let both the stayers and exiters use of all of Yj,
a legitimate solution if Yj satises constant returns to scale (CRS).5 But if Yj shows
decreasing returns to scale, then the stayers and exiters would collectively be capable
of productions that the unied economy had not been able to produce. To avoid this
problem, we assume that, for any rational rm j, the rational agents when they exit can
use a scaled-down version of any production available to j, where the scaling factor must
be less than or equal to the share of rm j that the rational consumers own: for each
j 2 FR we set some nonnegative j 
P
i2IR ij and let the rational agents when they exit
use any production bundle that equals jyj for some yj 2 Yj. The bound on j prevents
a partitioned economy from producing previously unavailable bundles. One reasonable
way to proceed would be to set j = 0 if j is at least partly owned by irrational consumers
and shows decreasing returns, j = 1 if j is wholly owned by rational consumers, and
j > 0 if j is partly owned by rational consumers and satises CRS (which in the last
case would let the rational agents use any yj 2 Yj).
To extend Proposition 1, dene a production equilibrium (p; x; y) to be Pareto e¢ cient
for the rational agents if there does not exist a ((exi)i2IR , (eyj)j2FR) such that exi %i xi for
each i 2 IR and with strict preference for some i 2 IR, eyj 2 Yj for each j 2 FR, and
X
i2IR
exi X
i2IR
ei +
X
j2FR
jeyj.
Assuming that consumer preferences satisfy the assumptions of the previous section, we
5A production set Yj satises CRS if   0 and yj 2 Yj imply yj 2 Yj . Normally CRS has no
content: for any Yj that exhibits decreasing returns we can invent a new commodity input specic to
rm j, distributed to consumers to match their ownership share in j, and a new CRS production set
Y j that coincides with Yj at the points in Y j where the coordinate of the invented good equals 1. The
behavior of the economy with these Y j will be identical to the behavior of the original economy. We
could use this trick to dene the productions available to departing rational agents: this is in fact the
special case in the model below where j =
P
i2IR ij for each rational rm j. But both this special case
and our general model go beyond an accounting convention: since we are considering the consequences
of an actual exit, letting an exiting rm j use a scaled-down version of Yj is a substantive assumption
about how technology can be subdivided.
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can conclude that production equilibria are Pareto e¢ cient for the rational agents, re-
gardless of the number of irrational agents (see the appendix for a proof).
The more important feature of irrational rms is that they need not interfere with
full production e¢ ciency. To achieve production e¢ ciency, two conditions must be met.
First, the rational rms must have technologies that are at least as advanced as the
irrational rms: YR  YIR. If this condition were not satised if the irrational rms
can produce some bundles that the rational rms cannot  then the irrational rms
could produce ine¢ ciently and still survive market competition. The second condition
is a version of constant returns to scale. In a world of decreasing-returns technologies,
prot-maximizing rms can earn positive prots in equilibrium. Hence one or more of
these rms could instead operate ine¢ ciently, using its prots to subsidize its ine¢ cient
production. One simple assumption (stronger than what we will impose) that would rule
out this scenario would be to suppose, in addition to YR  YIR, that YR exhibits constant
returns. Constant returns is not terribly demanding; it in e¤ect requires that all inputs
are marketed commodities.6
The assumption that we do use is weaker and folds in the requirement that YR  YIR.
If there exists a constant-returns production set bY such that YR  bY  YIR, we say that
YR constant-returns dominates YIR. The main advantage of constant-returns domination
over plain constant returns arises when there are industries where no irrational rms
operate: in these industries, we can allow any or all of the rational rms to exhibit
decreasing returns.
A production equilibrium (p; x; y) is production e¢ cient if there does not exist (eyj 2
Yj)j2F such that
P
j2F eyj >Pj2F yj.
Proposition 3 If YR constant-returns dominates YIR then any production equilibrium
with p  0 is production e¢ cient, regardless of the number of irrational consumers or
rms.
6Once again we cannot resort to the trick of rationalizing constant returns by postulating a rm-
specic input for each rm with a decreasing-returns technology. The reason however is not that we
need to consider any fractional rescalings of production sets, but interference with the requirement that
YR  YIR: if each rational rm requires a rm-specic input in order to produce, then any y in YIR that
actually produces some good and does not use any of the rational rmsspecic inputs cannot be in YR.
So constant returns to scale must be given its standard substantive interpretation.
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No exit of rational agents is involved in Proposition 3; production e¢ ciency obtains
despite the presence of irrational agents. If, in addition to the assumptions of Proposition
3, every consumer is rational then full Pareto e¢ ciency obtains.
The compatibility of irrational rms and full production e¢ ciency contrasts with the
more limited e¢ ciency-for-the-rational-agents that holds on the consumer side. This diver-
gence parallels the di¤erent punishments that competitive markets mete out to irrational
producers and consumers. The consumers of market economies need not be any more
rational than their counterparts in other institutional settings; their optimization errors
only bring about a utility loss. But competitive markets can drive backward producers
out of business, putting rms on a tighter leash.
Formally, the economies in Proposition 3 achieve production e¢ ciency instantaneously.
A more realistic picture emerges if we apply the constant returns to scale condition only
to the long run; then irrational rms can survive for a while and are only driven slowly
from the market. Constant returns and hence constant-returns domination are question-
able when imposed on production for the near future since outputs in the near future
require inputs, such as installed capital equipment, that are not marketed commodities.
In these shorter time frames where decreasing returns prevails, ine¢ cient irrational rms
can survive. But constant returns to scale or constant-returns domination is plausible
when imposed on production for the more distant future since all inputs should then be
purchasable. If production activities for the immediate future are separable from activi-
ties for the more distant future, and irrational rms do not use their short-run prots to
cross-subsidize long-run production, the logic of Proposition 3 will eventually apply: after
enough time passes, production e¢ ciency will obtain.
For an example of how the dynamic path to full e¢ ciency plays out, let time run from
1 to T and suppose each rm j produces a single good at each date. Assume for each
period t that the production set of rm j for its output at t, Yj(t), uses an input stream
that lasts for  periods. The outputs that appear before date  therefore use inputs prior
to date 1 but these inputs are not included among the economys L goods.7 Let the
rational rms have technology that is at least as good as the technology of the irrational
7As always, each Yj(t) is a subset of RL.
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rms:
P
j2FR
PT
t=1 Yj(t) 
P
j2FIR
PT
t=1 Yj(t). Because the production of outputs at
early dates requires inputs that have to be applied before date 1, the Yj(t) for t <  may
exhibit decreasing returns to scale, but suppose that the Yj(t) exhibit constant returns
to scale for t   . Then, as t increases, the number of outputs produced under constant
returns to scale increases. The economy can proceed through time by letting a rm j
incur debt when it begins the purchase of an input stream and then paying o¤ this debt
and distributing any prots to its shareholders when the output appears  periods later,
thus ruling out cross-subsidization. In an equilibrium where the rational rms maximize
prots and all rms must earn nonnegative prots, Proposition 3 applies to all the outputs
produced under constant returns. The number of outputs whose production is e¢ cient
therefore steadily increases through time. If an inow of new rms introduces more
advanced technology into some existing sectors and if these entrants do not maximize
prots, then production ine¢ ciency could obtain in some sectors of the economy while
it is being driven out in the innovation-free sectors. Competitive general equilibrium
models with irrational agents can thus give a Schumpeterian account of rm entry-exit
dynamics.
In a competitive equilibrium model that contains only rational agents, a rm with
su¢ ciently backward technology will shut itself down. In the present model, as in the
Schumpeterian tradition, irrational rms with backward technology rms must be driven
out of business.8 Although the two mechanisms will often cause the same rms to exit
they can lead to sharply di¤erent policy advice. Consider, for instance, the traditional
design of trade liberalization and deregulation policies that harm rms that have been
protected from market competition. When rms or consumers could be harmed by (and
might therefore obstruct) reforms, the classical welfare theorems show how to engineer
Pareto improvements using lump-sum compensation payments. But with irrational rms,
lump-sum payments can undermine production e¢ ciency: they give irrational rms the
leeway to take ine¢ cient actions without going bankrupt. Irrational rms therefore
present policy-makers with a trade-o¤: Pareto improvements are possible if compensation
payments keep irrational rms aoat but then production e¢ ciency will be undermined.
8See Klette and Kortum (2004) and Lentz and Mortensen (2005) for modern Schumpeterian ap-
proaches.
11
Either production e¢ ciency or a Pareto improvement can be achieved but not both.9
Despite the common ground with Schumpeter, the logic presented here for why the
rational and e¢ cient rms come to predominate di¤ers from the evolutionary mechanisms
that the main Schumpeterian modeling tradition has relied on. In Proposition 3, produc-
tion e¢ ciency is achieved entirely through the price system, as the rational rms drive
the irrational rms from the market. In evolutionary models (e.g., Nelson and Winter
(1982) and earlier Alchian (1950) and Friedman (1953)), in contrast, the e¢ cient rms
become more prevalent because they make larger prots and grow faster.
To summarize, the theory of production e¢ ciency in this paper is distinct from both
the evolutionary and Arrow-Debreu explanations. The present account operates via the
price mechanism but does without the Arrow-Debreu assumption of universal rationality.
4 Games with irrational agents
The irrationality-proofness of e¢ ciency in competitive markets raises the question of
whether markets are distinctive in this regard. Can games do as well as markets? To com-
pare like with like, we consider games that fully implement competitive allocations and
assess the irrationality-proofness of their e¢ ciency properties. Under the assumption that
all agents are rational, the starting point of Walrasian and Nash equilibria, markets and
games that implement competitive outcomes bear a close resemblance. But di¤erences
come out when we let some agents be irrational. The typical constructions of classical
implementation theory are brittle: just one irrational agent can lead to nonexistence of
equilibria or ine¢ ciency for the rational agents. But better-performing games can be
designed.
There are many ways to dene equilibrium in games with irrational agents. We take
the view, discussed in the introduction, that irrational agents can be predictable, and
therefore dene equilibrium as a strategy prole such that the strategy of each rational
agent is a best response to the strategies of all other agents, whether they be rational or
irrational, just as in a Nash equilibrium of a standard game every agent best responds
9The working paper version of this article uses the example of trade liberalization to illustrate this
dilemma.
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to the strategies played by the other agents. Our denition of equilibrium thus stakes
out a compromise: we let some agents be irrational, avoiding the full-bore rationality
assumptions of Nash implementation, but also let rational agents best-respond to the
actions of irrational agents the rationals do not think the irrationals as so erratic that
they must play strategies that are optimal no matter how the irrationals act. The value of
the compromise is that desirable equilibria will exist. As we will see, a dominant-strategy
approach would lead to an impossibility result.
To keep the parallels between markets and games tight, we consider mechanisms that
fully implement the outcomes that are targeted: when all agents are rational, the set of
equilibrium outcomes and the set of competitive allocations will coincide exactly, just as
all competitive equilibria lead to competitive allocations when all agents are rational.
There are again L goods, and each agent i 2 I has an endowment ei  0 and prefer-
ences %i, dened over nonnegative bundles of the L goods, that are complete, transitive,
monotone, continuous, and convex.10 We x the endowment prole (e1; :::; eI) through-
out, where I is the number of agents.11 If there are competitive allocations on the
boundary of agentsconsumptions sets then those allocations would not be Nash imple-
mentable (Hurwicz, Maskin, and Postlewaite (HMP) (1995)). So, even in the absence
of irrational agents, there would be no game whose equilibria exactly coincide with the
competitive allocations, hampering comparison to the rest of the paper. To step around
this problem, we make an interiority assumption that each is indi¤erence curve through
ei does not intersect the coordinate axes.12 When agentspreferences (%i)i2I satisfy the
assumptions of this paragraph, we say that (%i)i2I (or simply the model) is admissible.
For any admissible model, an exchange equilibrium (as dened in section 2) exists. Let
e denote
P
i2I e
i.
A mechanism is dened by strategy sets Si for i 2 I and an outcome function g that
maps each strategy prole s = (s1; :::; sI) to a feasible allocation x = (x1; :::; xI), that is,
10The preferences %i are monotone if xi > zi implies xi i zi, convex if  2 [0; 1] and xi %i zi imply
xi + (1  )zi %i zi, and continuous if fxi 2 RL+ : xi %i zig and fxi 2 RL+ : zi %i xig are closed sets for
all zi 2 RL+.
11Equivalently, we could let e = (e1; :::; eI) vary and assume that the game designer knows e and can
use this information along with agentsstrategy choices to determine allocations. We could also let e be
revealed by agentsstrategy choices.
12Formally, %i satises interiority if, for all xi 2 RL+, xi %i ei ) xi  0.
13
a x where
P
i2I x
i  e. Given a mechanism and an admissible (%i)i2I , an equilibrium is
a pair (s = (s1; :::; sI); IR) that species the strategies that all agents play and a set of
rational agents IR such that, for each i 2 IR,
gi(s) %i gi(es i; s i) for all es i 2 Si.
So each rational i in an equilibrium (s; IR) is optimizing with si given that the other
agents play s i.
A mechanism ((Si)i2I ; g) implements competitive allocations when the set of rational
agents is IR if, for any admissible model (%i)i2I and any allocation x,
(there is an equilibrium (s; IR) such that x = g(s)), 
(p; x) is an exchange equilibrium for (%i)i2I for some p

.
In words, a mechanism implements competitive allocations when IR is the set of rational
agents if, for all preference proles, any equilibrium outcome of the mechanism when IR
is the set of rational agents is a competitive allocation, and conversely for any competitive
allocation there is an equilibrium of the mechanism when IR is the set of rational agents
whose outcome is that allocation. Although it will turn out that competitive allocations
cannot be implemented when some agents are irrational just as they cannot be in an
exchange economy with irrational agents  our denition is designed to say what the
implementation of competitive allocations would mean in such cases.
The above denition indicates our use of a fullconcept of implementation: the sets of
equilibrium outcomes and competitive allocations coincide when all agents are rational.
A weaker denition would require only that for each competitive allocation x there is
some equilibrium that reaches x but would allow other equilibria to reach noncompetitive
allocations. The t with the competitive markets would then be looser, since competitive
equilibria always generate competitive allocations when all agents are rational. But
in addition the weaker denition of implementation would be too permissive. Some
games that for each competitive allocation x have an equilibrium that reaches x can also
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implement a vast set of other allocations.13
We rst consider a specic mechanism, a much simplied version of a mechanism in
HMP, that fully implements competitive allocations when all agents are rational. The
introduction of irrational agents into this game blocks even the existence of equilibrium.
Example 1 Each Si = f(pi; xi) 2 (RL+nf0g)RL+ : pi xi = pi  eig. Given the strategies
(pi; xi)i2I, let P = fp : p = pi for some ig denote the set of price vectors that the agents
announce, and let #P be the number of distinct announced price vectors. The outcome
g((pi; xi)i2I) of the mechanism is then the allocation (xi)i2I dened by:
1: if #P = 1 and
P
i2I x
i = e, then
xi = xi for all i 2 I,
2: if#P = 2 and there is a k such that
pk > kpik for i 6= k, xk  e and pixk = piek,
then
xk = xk and xi = 0 for i 6= k,
3: if #P > 2 and there is a k such that
pk > kpik for i 6= k, then
xk = e and xi = 0 for i 6= k,
4: in all other cases, xi = 0 for all i 2 I.
It is easy to conrm that the allocation of any exchange equilibrium (p; (xi)i2I) is an
equilibrium outcome of this mechanism when all agents are rational, IR = I. In the
equilibrium, each agent i names p and xi: if there are at least two agents, rules 2 and
4 imply that any unilateral deviation for an agent k can at best lead to a exk such that
pexk = pek. Conversely, given an equilibrium of the mechanism, (pi; xi)i2I , rules 2, 3, and
4 imply that if two or more agents name di¤erent prices then only an agent k who names
a price vector such that
pk > kpik for all i 6= k will avoid the 0 bundle; since there
can be only one such k, the equilibrium must have a unanimous announcement of prices
p. And the xi must satisfy
P
i2I x
i = e since otherwise any agent would take advantage
of rule 2 to avoid the 0 bundle. Rule 2 also implies that any agent k could by deviating
achieve any exk  e such that p  exk = p  ek. Given that ek is therefore achievable, the
interiority assumption implies that each xk  0. Since Pi2I xi = e, we have e xi for
13Consider, for example, a mechanism where all agents name an allocation x; if everyone names the
same x then each i receives xi and otherwise everyone receives the 0 bundle. Any allocation is then an
equilibrium outcome when all agents are rational.
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all i, assuming that there are at least two agents. It then follows from convexity that for
any i there is no exi i xi with p  exi = p  ei, whether exi is feasible or not (see the proof of
Proposition 4 for more detail on this point). Thus the equilibrium delivers a competitive
allocation.14
The all-rational equilibria are delicate however. If the population includes irrational
agents who choose arbitrary elements of Sk then typically there will be no equilibria. If
two or more irrational agents choose di¤erent prices and there are two or more rational
agents, then there will be no prole of optimizing strategies for the rational agents (just
as in the previous paragraph). If there is a single irrational agent i, still with two or more
rational agents, then unless xi and the Walrasian demands of the rational agents at pi
happen to sum to e there will be no equilibrium: there again could not be a unanimous
announcement of prices since one of the rational agents would take advantage of rule 2 to
name a di¤erent price and achieve his Walrasian demand. Existence of equilibrium thus
displays a minimal level of irrationality-proofness: if there are two rational agents then
just one irrational agent is enough to prevent there from being an equilibrium.
The irrationality proofness problem of the above example is that equilibria fail to
exist when irrational agents are present. Other mechanisms that implement competitive
allocations when all agents are rational, e.g., Jackson et al. (1994) which uses undominated
Nash equilibria, always have equilibria when irrational agents are present but fail to
achieve Pareto e¢ ciency for the rational agents.
Are there mechanisms that, when all agents are rational, fully implement competitive
allocations and, when some agents are irrational, not only have equilibria but have only
equilibria that achieve Pareto e¢ ciency for the rational agents?
As in section 2, a coalition C can achieve (xi)i2C by exiting if
P
i2C x
i  Pi2C ei.
Given IR, let us say that the allocation (xi)i2I is Pareto e¢ cient for the rational agents
if there is no (exi)i2IR that IR can achieve by exiting such that exi %i xi for all i 2 IR andexi i xi for some i 2 IR. Finally, a mechanism ((Si)i2I ; g) is Pareto e¢ cient for the
14If there is a single agent then rules 1 and 4 imply that the only equilibrium allocation of the mech-
anism is e1, which is the competitive allocation. The fact that the mechanism implements competitive
allocations when all agents are rational without a restriction on the number of agents is due to our
assumption that goods can be freely disposed of.
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rational agents if, for any admissible (%i)i2I , any set of rational agents IR  I, and any
strategy prole for the irrational agents (si)i2IIR , there is an equilibrium (s; IR) where
the irrational agents play (si)i2IIR and, for every equilibrium (s; IR) when the irrationals
play (si)i2IIR , g(s) is Pareto e¢ cient for the rational agents. In line with our denition
of the implementation of competitive allocations, we require that every equilibrium, not
just one, leads to an outcome that is Pareto e¢ cient for the rational.
Proposition 4 There are mechanisms that are both Pareto e¢ cient for the rational
agents and implement competitive allocations when all agents are rational.
Thus there are games that perform reasonably well regardless of the number of irra-
tional agents and how they play. The proof of Proposition 4 designs a mechanism with
two stages of competition. The rst stage ensures that if some or all of the irrational
agents choose strategies that are inconsistent with an outcome that is Pareto e¢ cient for
the rational then the rational agents can split o¤ on their own; they can defeat some
or all of the irrational agents in an integer game and determine a nal allocation using
only their own resources and the resources of any irrational agents who do happen to
choose compatible strategies. A victorious blocthat contains all of the rational agents
thus emerges from the rst stage. The second stage is more traditional and is similar to
the HMP mechanism. If a single agent in the victorious bloc deviates from a candidate
equilibrium the deviator can achieve only those bundles that are in a budget set dened
by prices that the agents in the victorious bloc simultaneously announce. Multiple de-
viations on the other hand set o¤ an unwinnable integer game where everyone but the
winner receives an undesirable bundle. As usual this device blocks outcomes that the
mechanism aims to avoid (in our case, the allocations that fail to be Pareto e¢ cient for
the rational). The integer games in the two stages thus serve opposite purposes: in the
rst, some or all of the irrationals may well be defeated in equilibrium while in the second
there can be no winner.
The universe of possible mechanisms displays such strategic variety that one might
wonder if we can do better: are there mechanisms that implement competitive allocations
even when irrational agents are present? The answer is no. For suppose two models,
1 and 2, di¤er only in the preferences of the irrational agents and let each have a unique
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competitive allocation that di¤ers from the competitive allocation of the other model.
If competitive allocations were always achieved then, in either model k, for any strat-
egy prole that the irrational agents might play, there would be a prole of equilibrium
strategies for the rational agents that leads to the competitive outcome of model k. But
if, say, model 1 obtains and the irrational agents play some prole (si)i2IIR , it will be an
equilibrium for the rational agents to play the prole that they play in model 2 when the
irrational play (si)i2IIR (since the rational agentspreferences are unchanged).
Proposition 5 There is no mechanism that implements competitive allocations when
IR 6= I (i.e., some agent is irrational).
Games and competitive markets therefore share some common ground. As with
markets, games with irrational agents cannot always reach a competitive outcome but
they can achieve Pareto e¢ ciency for the rational agents. Still there is an important
di¤erence between markets and games. In the mechanisms that underlie Proposition 4,
when irrational agents do not choose strategies compatible with an e¢ cient allocation the
rational agents trump them and split o¤ on their own. In fact, the rational agents will
typically end up with bundles that in the aggregate use only their own endowments. So
in games the property of Pareto e¢ ciency for the rational agentsdoes not imply that the
rational agents will gain from the presence of irrational agents. In contrast, as we saw in
section 2, in a competitive equilibrium the rational agents will generically trade with the
irrational agents and thus achieve welfare levels that they could not achieve on their own
(see Proposition 2). In this generic sense, markets can outperform full-implementation
games: they automatically use the resources of the irrational agents to make the rationals
better o¤.
If the strategic actions of irrational agents cannot be predicted, then our denition of
equilibrium is open to criticism. In our equilibria, each rational agent best responds to the
strategies that all other agents play, whether they are rational or irrational; implicitly, the
rational agents know how the irrational play. To accommodate unpredictable irrational
agents, we could require that each rational agents strategy is a best response to the other
agentsstrategies, whatever set of agents turns out to be irrational and for all strategy
proles that the irrational agents might play. Since any agent can be irrational, this would
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require that rational agents play weakly dominant strategies. But then unfortunately
there cannot be a mechanism that is Pareto e¢ cient for the rational agents. For suppose
to the contrary that there were such a mechanism. Then, when all agents are rational
and play their dominant strategies, a core allocation would have to result: if instead an
allocation x were to occur that some coalition C could block, then when C is the set
of rational agents and the irrational agents happen to play their dominant strategies, x
would ensue and x cannot be Pareto e¢ cient for the rational (since IR = C and C can
block x). Since there is no dominant-strategy mechanism in an exchange economy setting
whose outcomes consist only of core allocations, we conclude that there is no mechanism
that is Pareto e¢ cient for the rational agents when rational agents are required to play
dominant strategies.15
Eliaz (2002), an innovative theory of implementation that allows for irrational agents,
takes a di¤erent tack and requires each rational agent to play a strategy that is optimal no
matter who is irrational and how they move. The Eliaz model avoids the roadblock that
accompanies dominant-strategy implementation by restricting the number of irrational
agents. In contrast, we placed no restrictions on the number of irrational agents in this
section or in section 2 and only minimal implicit restrictions in section 3.
We have avoided any hint of Bayesian implementation; all of our agents implicitly
have the same information. Had we permitted asymmetric information, there would have
been no hope for Pareto e¢ ciency for the rational agents. Implementation of e¢ cient
outcomes in the face of asymmetric information would require players with knowledge of
other agentscharacteristics to patrol those individuals, e.g., report their characteristics
to prevent them from misrepresenting themselves. Since irrational agents might fail to
undertake patrolling strategies, they can convert a model with nonexclusive information
(no single agent has privileged information) into a model with exclusive information. In
incomplete information settings, therefore, a single irrational agent can dramatically alter
what can be implemented.16
15See Serizawa (2002) for stronger impossibility results that imply that there is no mechanism that
implements only core allocations in our setting. Earlier results of this nature reach back to the seminal
Hurwicz (1972) and include Dasgupta et al. (1979), Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein (1981), and Zhou
(1991).
16See Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1986) and Blume and Easley (1990) for the implementation conse-
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5 Conclusion
One goal of irrationality-proofness is to serve as a robustness check. For the property
of a model to be reliable, it should survive the introduction of irrational agents who do
not trade or choose strategies optimally. By recasting e¢ ciency moving from classical
Pareto e¢ ciency to production e¢ ciency and to Pareto e¢ ciency for the rational agents 
competitive equilibria can pass the robustness test. Indeed, these alternative denitions
of e¢ ciency can withstand the introduction of large numbers of irrational agents. Our
conclusions are driven by the separating feature of prices: if rational consumers and rms
face a common price vector then constrained forms of e¢ ciency will hold, even when
irrational agents are present.
Our analysis of games shows that no inevitable divide between the irrationality-
proofness of e¢ ciency in games and in competitive markets. But in contrast to markets,
the conclusion that irrational agents in a game do little harm requires a careful construc-
tion: we have to let the rational agents strategies vary as a function of the irrational
agents strategies and rule out asymmetric information. From the broader perspective
freed from these restriction, the irrationality-proofness of e¢ ciency is more robust for
markets than for games.
6 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Let (p; x) be the competitive equilibrium. If the rational agents
can achieve (exi)i2IR by exiting, then Pi2IR exi  Pi2IR ei. Multiply by p to get (1)
p Pi2IR exi  p Pi2IR ei. If (exi)i2IR is a Pareto improvement for the rational agents,
then (2) exi %i xi for all i 2 IR, and (3) exh h xh for some h 2 IR. Given the optimization
of the rational agents, (3) implies p exh > p eh, and, since each %i is transitive and locally
nonsatiated for each i 2 IR, (2) implies p  exi  p  ei for all i 2 IR. Sum over i 2 IR to
get p Pi2IR exi > p Pi2IR ei, contradicting (1).
Proof of Proposition 2. First observe that if (p; x) is the exchange equilibrium and (exi)i2IR
quences of exclusive information.
20
satises X
i2IR
exi X
i2IR
ei + '
X
i2IIR
(ei   xi) (i)
for some ' 2 R then (1) in the proof of Proposition 1 will obtain (since pPi2IIR(ei xi) =
0). Hence if (exi)i2IR satises (i) then (exi)i2IR does not Pareto dominate (xi)i2IR .
If IR can achieve (exi)i2IR by exiting and exi %i xi for all i 2 IR, then Proposition 1
implies exi i xi for all i 2 IR. Since there is a k with p(k)Pi2IR(xi(k)  ei(k)) 6= 0, and
since pPi2IR(xi ei) = 0, there must be a l with p(l) > 0 such thatPi2IR(xi(l) ei(l)) >
0. Since any allocation (exi)i2IR achieved by exiting must satisfy Pi2IR exi  Pi2IR ei,
we conclude that (exi)i2IR 6= (xi)i2IR and therefore exh 6= xh for some h 2 IR. By strict
convexity, if  2 (0; 1) then xh + (1   )exh h xh . Thus (xi + (1   )exi)i2IR Pareto
dominates (xi)i2IR . Since however,
X
i2IR
xi 
X
i2IR
ei +
X
i2IIR
(ei   xi), andX
i2IR
exi  X
i2IR
ei;
we have X
i2IR
(xi + (1  )exi) X
i2IR
ei + 
X
i2IIR
(ei   xi).
Since (xi + (1  )exi)i2IR therefore satises (i), we have a contradiction.
Proof of Extension of Proposition 1. Only a couple changes to the proof of Proposition
1 are needed. If the rational agents can achieve a Pareto improvement by exiting, there
exist (exi)i2IR and (eyj)j2FR , where each eyj 2 Yj, such that exi %i xi for each i 2 IR, with
strict preference for some i 2 IR, and
P
i2IR exi Pi2IR ei +Pj2FR jeyj. Since eyj 2 Yj,
prot maximization gives jp  yj  jp  eyj for each j 2 FR. Hence p Pi2IR exi 
p Pi2IR ei + p Pj2FR jyj. But optimization for the rational agents implies p  exi 
p  ei + p Pj2FR ijyj for all i 2 IR, with strict inequality holding for some i 2 IR.
Summing over the rational consumers and using the fact that j 
P
i2IR ij gives the
contradiction p Pi2IR exi > p Pi2IR ei + p Pj2FR jyj.
Proof of Proposition 3. Let (p; x; y) be an equilibrium with p  0 and suppose it is
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not production e¢ cient. There would then exist (y0j)j2F such that
P
j2F y
0
j >
P
j2F yj.
Since p  0, p Pj2F y0j > p Pj2F yj. But since the rational rms are maximizing,
p Pj2FR y0j  p Pj2FR yj. Hence p Pj2FIR y0j > p Pj2FIR yj and so p Pj2FIR y0j > 0.
Since YR constant-returns dominates YIR there exists a constant-returns production setbY such that YR  bY  YIR. Hence there is a by 2 bY and (byj)j2FR such that Pj2FR byj =by =Pj2FIR y0j. So p Pj2FR byj > 0, and since bY satises constant returns, for any  > 0,

P
j2FR byj 2 YR. Hence for any  > 0 there exists a (eyj)j2FR , with each eyj 2 Yj, such
that p Pj2FR eyj = p Pj2FR byj = p Pj2FR byj, and so there must be a j 2 FR such
that p  eyj  1jFRjp Pj2FR byj. Since (i) for each  > 0 there is a j 2 FR and eyj 2 Yj
satisfying this inequality, (ii) 1jFRj

p Pj2FR byj > 0, and (iii) there are nitely many
rms, there must be at least one rm in FR that can make unboundedly great prots,
contradicting the assumption that (yj)j2FR are equilibrium production decisions.
Proof of Proposition 4. We x the admissible model throughout. The mechanism consists
of two parts. The rst part determines if there is a victorious coalition. The rst four
coordinates of a strategy si for agent i are relevant to this part: these are Ci I which
gives is proposal of a coalition, a coalition integerni 2 N, a price pi 2 RL+nf0g, and a
consumption bundle xi 2 RL+. Given (Ci; ni; pi; xi)i2I , C is victorious i¤ there exists (n; p)
such that (1) for each i 2 C, Ci = C, pi = p, ni = n, and p  xi = p  ei, (2) n > nk for each
k =2 C, and (3) Pi2C xi = Pi2C ei. So the agents in a victorious C must all propose C,
play a common n that defeats all outsiders in an integer game, announce a common price,
and announce consumption bundles that are individually a¤ordable and jointly feasible
using the resources of C. If there is no victorious coalition, the mechanism g assigns each
i 2 I the consumption bundle 0.
In the second part of the mechanism, which is relevant only if there is a victorious
coalition C, any agent in C can reject the bundle assigned to him in the rst part. The
second part of each si has three components: a a or r, which indicates whether i accepts
or rejects is assigned bundle, an integer mi that determines the dominant rejection,
and the consumption wi that i proposes to receive if is rejection is dominant. Joining
together the two parts of a strategy, we have, for each i 2 I, Si = (2INRL+nf0gRL+)
 (fa; rg  RL+  N) with typical element si = (Ci; ni; pi; xi; a or r; wi;mi).
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If C is victorious and, for all i 2 C, si announces a then we say C is unanimous.
If there is a victorious and unanimous coalition C, then the outcome given by g is for
each i 2 C to receive the xi given by si and for each i =2 C to receive the 0 bundle. If
there is a coalition C that is victorious but not unanimous, dene the set of rejectors
RC = fi 2 C: i announces rg. If #RC  2 the integer game in the second part of the
mechanism determines the dominant rejection: if there is a i 2 C such that mi > mk for
k 2 Cnfig and wi  e, then the outcome is for i to receive wi and each k 2 Infig to
receive 0. In all other cases with #RC  2, the outcome is for each i to receive 0. If
RC = fig but p wi 6= p  ei or wi >
P
k2C e
k (where p is the common price announcement
of the members of C), then each k 2 I receives 0. Finally we impose the following single
deviation rule: if RC = fig, p  wi = p  ei, and wi 
P
k2C e
k, then the outcome is that i
receives wi and each k 2 Infig receives 0.
We x the strategies of i 2 IIR, and let nIR denote maxfni : i 2 IIRg. Let (p; xi)i2IR
be an exchange equilibrium for the society consisting solely of IR. Then (IR; nIR+1; p; xi;
a; 0; 1) is an equilibrium. For suppose some i 2 IR deviates by announcing a di¤erent
coalition, a di¤erent price, or a di¤erent coalition integer. If this deviation does not permit
there to be a victorious coalition then i would receive 0 and so the deviation would not
be undertaken. And the deviation can permit there to be a victorious coalition only if
ni > nIR + 1 and is coalition announcement is fig, in which case i receives either the
consumption exi = ei or exi = 0; since in either case, xi %i exi, we again conclude that it is
optimizing for i not to deviate. If on the other hand i deviates with (IR; nIR + 1; p; xi;
r; wi;mi) then i receives either 0 (if p wi 6= p ei or wi >Pk2IR ek) or, given the denition
of an exchange equilibrium, a wi with xi %i wi. Thus for any strategy prole for the
irrational agents, there is an equilibrium where the irrational agents play that prole.
Furthermore, given Proposition 1 and the fact that (p; xi)i2IR is an exchange equilibrium
for IR, the equilibrium outcome is Pareto e¢ cient for the rational agents. In the case
where IIR = ?, for any exchange equilibrium (p; x), the outcome of the above equilibrium
is the competitive allocation x.
It remains to show that any equilibrium outcome is Pareto e¢ cient for the rational
agents and is the competitive allocation when IIR = ?. Let x be an arbitrary equilibrium
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outcome. Since Pareto e¢ ciency for the rational agents holds vacuously if IR = ?, we
suppose that IR 6= ?. Since any agent i can receive ei by announcing (fig; ni; pi; ei;
a; 0; 1), where ni > nk for all k 2 Infig, there must be exactly one victorious coalition C
and IR must be a subset of C. For the remainder of the proof, let p be the price vector
announced by C. If #IR  2, then C must be unanimous since otherwise the agents in C
play an integer game with no equilibrium each i 2 IR would have to announce a ni such
that ni > nk for all k 2 Cnfig. Continuing with the case where C is victorious (and hence
unanimous) and #IR  2, the single deviation rule implies, for i 2 IR, that xi must be
a %i-maximum on fwi 2 RL+ : p  wi = p  ei; wi 
P
k2C e
kg. Given the monotonicity of
%i, p  0. Given interiority, the outcome for IR  C, (xi)i2IR , is strictly greater than
0 in every coordinate; therefore, since #IR  2,
P
k2C e
k  xi for i 2 IR. There must
therefore be a " > 0 such that any wi with kxi   wik < " and p  wi = p  ei satises
wi  Pk2C ek and hence xi %i wi. The convexity of %i then implies that if exi %i xi
then p  exi  p  ei. For if there were a exi 2 RL+ with exi %i xi and p  exi < p  ei then by
convexity xi = exi + (1  )xi %i xi for any  2 (0; 1); and so by choosing  su¢ ciently
small and since p  0, we can nd a wi  xi with kxi   wik < " and p  wi = p  ei,
which by monotonicity satises wi i xi and hence wi i xi. So exi %i xi ) p  exi  p  ei.
But exi i xi and p  exi = p  ei cannot occur: if it did then exi i xi %i ei and interiority
give exi  0 and so, by continuity, for any  2 (0; 1) su¢ ciently near 1, exi i xi and
p  exi < p  ei. Hence, for i 2 IR, xi is %i-maximizing on fwi 2 RL+ : p  wi = p  eig.
We can then apply the proof of Proposition 1, using the price p announced by all k 2 C,
to conclude that the equilibrium satises Pareto e¢ ciency for the rational agents. In
the case where C is victorious and #IR = 1, the agent i 2 IR must receive an outcome
xi %i ei since i could receive ei by announcing (fig; ni; pi; ei; a; 0; 1), where ni > nk for all
k 2 Infig (as at the beginning of the paragraph). Hence the equilibrium again satises
Pareto e¢ ciency for the rational agents. Finally, notice that if IIR = ? then C = I.
Since, furthermore, the outcome xi is %i-maximizing on fwi 2 RL+ : p  wi = p  eig for
each i 2 I, (p; x) must be an exchange equilibrium. So, when IIR = ?, the outcome x
of any equilibrium is the allocation of an exchange equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 5. In the text.
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